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The euro does not provide its members with any option to leave. This protects the  
common currency against speculative attacks on the one hand. The euro crisis  
demonstrated on the other hand how difficult it is for Eurozone countries to con­
structively solve economic and fiscal policy conflicts among themselves. Why was  
the euro designed as a one­way street? What would be the consequences of an exit  
option? And what alternatives are there to an exit?
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„L’euro è irrevocabile. The euro is irreversible.  
Questo è il trattato. This is the Treaty.“
Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank 
in a hearing at the European Parliament  
on 6 February 2017
“There is no such thing as temporary Grexit, 
there is only a Grexit or no Grexit. There is 
Greece in the euro zone or Greece not in the 
euro zone. But in that case it’s Europe that 
retreats and no longer progresses […].” 
François Hollande, President of the Republic of France 
according to the news agency Reuters on 12 July 2015
“I will demand from the EU that we gain control over our 
currency. That means converting the euro from a single 
currency to a common currency. A currency that does not 
affect daily purchases, but only the large companies that 
engage in international trade.”
Marine Le Pen, Chairwoman of the French party Front National 
in Le Parisien on 30 April 2017
Why was the euro designed
as a one-way street?
System of fixed  
exchange rates
An agreement among states 
to keep the exchange rate 
between currencies at a 
pre-fixed level. If financial 
markets view this rate as 
too high or too low, the 
central bank has to stabilise  
it by buying or selling cur-
rency. However, persistent 
pressure may force the 
central bank to abandon 
the exchange rate.  
European Stability  
Mechanism (ESM)
The ESM is a financial  
institution that is controlled 
by the Eurozone countries.  
It allows for individual 
countries to be supported 
through loans if they risk to 
become illiquid. The ESM 
can lend up to 500 billion 
euro, with 373 billion euro 
still available. 
Troika
Name for the representatives 
of the European Commission, 
the IMF and the ECB who 
negotiate the joint bail out 
programmes with countries 
in crisis and check com- 
pliance with reform require- 
ments. If the ESM is included, 
one may refer to a Quadriga. 
Parallel currency
If a state introduces a par- 
allel currency in an economic 
crisis, for example by issuing 
government-backed IOUs,  
it can settle its liabilities do-
mestically and control the  
money supply. A new curren-
cy could freely devalue vis-à-
vis the euro and would make 
exports more competitive, 
but this would also lead to a 
sharp rise in inflation. 
How has the Eurozone 
handled possible exits?  
At the start of the euro crisis, all 
Eurozone members were in agree- 
ment that there could be no exit 
option. Instead, the Eurozone set up 
bailout funds such as the ESM for 
countries in crisis, with these pro-
grammes providing bridging loans in 
return for budget consolidation and 
extensive economic reforms. During 
and after the crisis, however, debate 
has raged on what level of budget cuts 
is appropriate and on whether leaving 
the currency union might be the lesser 
evil in some cases.
The choice between implementing 
painful reforms and leaving the 
euro has been too much for national 
democracies. This was seen most 
clearly in the case of Greece where a 
clear majority of the people voted to 
reject the EU bailout in 2015. At the 
same time, however, two-thirds of 
Greeks wanted to remain in the euro. 
Other European governments rejected 
a haircut for Greek debt, pointing out 
that they had a democratic mandate of 
their own. Consequently, the will of 
the people could not be implemented 
simultaneously everywhere. The Greek 
government ultimately decided to stay  
in the Eurozone by accepting the 
conditions of the  Troika.
The absence of any official exit op-
tion has held the Eurozone together. 
There is no obvious way to kick a 
country out of the common currency 
and the European Treaties foresee no 
euro exit without an EU exit. Since 
there was no clear political and legal 
framework, the European Central 
Bank took on a key role in the crisis: 
It could have cut off Greek banks from 
the supply of money, which would 
have forced the government to in-
troduce a  parallel currency and thus 
effectively leave the euro.
The European Treaties stipulate that 
the introduction of the euro is irre-
versible. There is no option to leave. 
That is in line with the core logic of 
the EU where peace is founded upon 
economic exchanges; such exchanges 
upon one common market; and the 
common market in turn upon the fact 
that the member states do not create 
any unfair advantages in trade by in-
tentionally weakening their currency. 
The departure of a country from 
the Eurozone would destabilise the 
entire currency union. Additional 
departures and thus related losses 
on euro-denominated financial 
assets would suddenly be possible. 
The currency union would hardly 
be more credible than a  system 
of fixed exchange rates. Capital market 
participants would find it enticing 
to flee from crisis countries and bet 
on further exits.
The euro crisis showed, however, 
that irreversibility also raises prob-
lems. It can be difficult for members 
of the currency union to escape an 
economic crisis. A Eurozone country 
cannot devalue its currency so as to 
sell its own products more cheaply  
on the global market. What’s more,  
it cannot pursue a monetary policy  
tailored to its needs in order to stimu- 
late investment. Instead, a Eurozone 
country in a crisis often has no other 
option than to drastically reduce wages 
and make its exports more attractive 
that way. The population suffers from 
this “internal devaluation”.
The dilemma: National sovereignty 
is difficult to combine with European 
stability. What is to be done if a Euro-
zone country does not recover and  
the population grows tired of cutting 
back and implementing reforms under  
 European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
programmes? On the one hand, a 
sovereign country would understand-
ably like to freely choose its economic 
policy. On the other, a country cannot 
obligate other Eurozone countries to 
cover the costs of these decisions. This 
is why – despite all the risks – it has 
been repeatedly discussed whether the 
currency union needs an exit option. 
“In case, debt sustainability and a credible implementation 
perspective cannot be ensured upfront, Greece should be 
offered swift negotiations on a time-out from the Eurozone, 
with possible debt restructuring, if necessary, […] over at 
least the next five years.” 
German Federal Ministry of Finance   
in a position paper on 11 July 2015
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A look 
ahead
“A euro exit does not permanently resolve either debt or economic problems. The governments of 
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mandates against each other. Instead, Europe needs to legitimise the governance of the common 
¨čúúµã¨ğ®µáë¨úćÉ¨ÚÚğëãćÆµ"čúëöµãÚµĘµÚȺµĘµãÉ¿ćÆćÉþĘµúğ®Éĭ¨čÚćɀɘ
Jörg Haas
The author is a Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin.
EURO EXIT
System of fixed exchange rates vs. currency union# 1
FACT What is the money from the  
bailout packages used for? 
The example of Greece, in billion euro
Euro bailout fund:  
How does the ESM function? # 2
FACT 
# 3
FACT 
The solvency of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is guaranteed by all Eurozone 
countries. This allows it to borrow money under better conditions and lend it to countries 
that do not have access to the capital markets themselves on account of a crisis. 
Source: Author’s representation.
A majority of the funds that Greece received in the first two European bailout packages went  
to private and public sector creditors. Only ten billion euro was used for classical government 
responsibilities such as investments, salaries or pension payments.
Source: Author’s graph, based on Jörg Rocholl, Axel Stahmer (2016): Where did the Greek bailout money go?  
ESMT Working Paper WP–16–02.
Although a system of fixed exchange rates and a currency union pursue similar goals, they 
differ in important regards. A system of fixed exchange rates limits its members less, but is 
more susceptible to speculative attacks.
Source: Author’s representation.
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 SCENARIO 1 
 Disorderly exit
If there are insurmountable differences of opinion between a Eurozone 
country in a sovereign debt crisis and the rest of the currency union, 
a disorderly exit is conceivable. The ECB can in effect exclude a highly 
indebted country from the euro by refusing to accept its government 
bonds as collateral. In this case, the affected country’s financial system 
would collapse. Either as a reaction to this situation or of its own accord, 
a state may introduce capital controls and a parallel currency.
There are doubts as to whether such an exit scenario is realistic:  
For example, a parallel currency would have to be printed secretly, the 
capital controls monitored perfectly, and the population forced to use 
the new currency. Even more difficult, however, is the question of 
who would be authorised to make such a decision without a demo­ 
cratic debate. This is because as soon as an exit is publicly considered, 
a massive flight of capital begins since companies and citizens fear 
the devaluation of their assets. This requires an immediate reaction: 
Either the state blocks the transfer of money overseas and thus takes 
the first step toward leaving the currency union or it puts an end to 
the exit discussions and seeks greater support from the ECB.
 SCENARIO 2 
Exit as threat
If the Eurozone sticks to the path of compromise between European 
stability and national sovereignty that it pursued during the crisis, 
the option of exclusion could continue to be used as a vaguely defined 
threat. If a country faces potential default, it negotiates with the Troika 
to set up a conditional lending programme.
A failure of the programme is a risk for all participants since the con­ 
sequences are unclear and potentially far­reaching. The bailed­out 
country fears immediate economic collapse, while the other Eurozone 
countries worry about the crisis spreading to more member states. 
Therefore, controversial negotiations repeatedly lead to a compromise. 
At the same time, however, the population in the crisis country has no 
democratic choice on the content of any reform programmes.
It is in the short­term interest of many Eurozone countries to preserve 
the status quo. This allows them to avoid an official exit option and 
nonetheless prompt countries at risk to introduce reforms. There are 
two risks in the medium term, however: First, the current approach 
strengthens euro­sceptical movements. Second, no precautions are 
taken to handle the event that a country decides, against expectations, 
to refuse a bailout programme.
 SCENARIO 3 
 Restructuring debt without exit
The conflict between sovereignty and stability can also be settled  
by offering Eurozone countries an orderly insolvency process for their 
debts without requiring an exit from the currency union. A country 
in crisis can decide between two options: Either it requires bailout 
loans and accepts the greater influence of the Eurozone over its 
economic and fiscal policy for the length of the bailout programme. 
Or it enters into a kind of insolvency process that entails very hard 
cut­backs over the short term, but the country maintains control 
over its economic policy.
In the past, a restructuring of debt was inconceivable. It was feared 
the European financial system was unequipped to handle the resulting 
losses, and financial markets would lose confidence in all euro­area 
sovereign debt. A new insolvency process would have to be accom­ 
panied by institutional reforms that strengthen the resilience of 
banks and credibly demonstrate that the Eurozone can protect each 
of its members if a country wants to.  
This scenario requires a strong central decision­making body such  
as a European finance minister who would in turn have to come 
under strict democratic control. To date, not all Eurozone countries 
are ready to transfer such competences to the EU. At the same time, how­ 
 ever, sharing sovereignty at the European level would re store member 
states to a position where they can again decide autonomously upon 
their economic policy.
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Effects
The euro does not provide its members with any option to leave. This protects the  
common currency against speculative attacks on the one hand. The euro crisis  
demonstrated on the other hand how difficult it is for Eurozone countries to con­
structively solve economic and fiscal policy conflicts among themselves. Why was  
the euro designed as a one­way street? What would be the consequences of an exit  
option? And what alternatives are there to an exit?
Leaving the euro: 
An emergency exit 
for the currency  
union?
„L’euro è irrevocabile. The euro is irreversible.  
Questo è il trattato. This is the Treaty.“
Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank 
in a hearing at the European Parliament  
on 6 February 2017
“There is no such thing as temporary Grexit, 
there is only a Grexit or no Grexit. There is 
Greece in the euro zone or Greece not in the 
euro zone. But in that case it’s Europe that 
retreats and no longer progresses […].” 
François Hollande, President of the Republic of France 
according to the news agency Reuters on 12 July 2015
“I will demand from the EU that we gain control over our 
currency. That means converting the euro from a single 
currency to a common currency. A currency that does not 
affect daily purchases, but only the large companies that 
engage in international trade.”
Marine Le Pen, Chairwoman of the French party Front National 
in Le Parisien on 30 April 2017
Why was the euro designed
as a one-way street?
System of fixed  
exchange rates
An agreement among states 
to keep the exchange rate 
between currencies at a 
pre-fixed level. If financial 
markets view this rate as 
too high or too low, the 
central bank has to stabilise  
it by buying or selling cur-
rency. However, persistent 
pressure may force the 
central bank to abandon 
the exchange rate.  
European Stability  
Mechanism (ESM)
The ESM is a financial  
institution that is controlled 
by the Eurozone countries.  
It allows for individual 
countries to be supported 
through loans if they risk to 
become illiquid. The ESM 
can lend up to 500 billion 
euro, with 373 billion euro 
still available. 
Troika
Name for the representatives 
of the European Commission, 
the IMF and the ECB who 
negotiate the joint bail out 
programmes with countries 
in crisis and check com- 
pliance with reform require- 
ments. If the ESM is included, 
one may refer to a Quadriga. 
Parallel currency
If a state introduces a par- 
allel currency in an economic 
crisis, for example by issuing 
government-backed IOUs,  
it can settle its liabilities do-
mestically and control the  
money supply. A new curren-
cy could freely devalue vis-à-
vis the euro and would make 
exports more competitive, 
but this would also lead to a 
sharp rise in inflation. 
How has the Eurozone 
handled possible exits?  
At the start of the euro crisis, all 
Eurozone members were in agree- 
ment that there could be no exit 
option. Instead, the Eurozone set up 
bailout funds such as the ESM for 
countries in crisis, with these pro-
grammes providing bridging loans in 
return for budget consolidation and 
extensive economic reforms. During 
and after the crisis, however, debate 
has raged on what level of budget cuts 
is appropriate and on whether leaving 
the currency union might be the lesser 
evil in some cases.
The choice between implementing 
painful reforms and leaving the 
euro has been too much for national 
democracies. This was seen most 
clearly in the case of Greece where a 
clear majority of the people voted to 
reject the EU bailout in 2015. At the 
same time, however, two-thirds of 
Greeks wanted to remain in the euro. 
Other European governments rejected 
a haircut for Greek debt, pointing out 
that they had a democratic mandate of 
their own. Consequently, the will of 
the people could not be implemented 
simultaneously everywhere. The Greek 
government ultimately decided to stay  
in the Eurozone by accepting the 
conditions of the  Troika.
The absence of any official exit op-
tion has held the Eurozone together. 
There is no obvious way to kick a 
country out of the common currency 
and the European Treaties foresee no 
euro exit without an EU exit. Since 
there was no clear political and legal 
framework, the European Central 
Bank took on a key role in the crisis: 
It could have cut off Greek banks from 
the supply of money, which would 
have forced the government to in-
troduce a  parallel currency and thus 
effectively leave the euro.
The European Treaties stipulate that 
the introduction of the euro is irre-
versible. There is no option to leave. 
That is in line with the core logic of 
the EU where peace is founded upon 
economic exchanges; such exchanges 
upon one common market; and the 
common market in turn upon the fact 
that the member states do not create 
any unfair advantages in trade by in-
tentionally weakening their currency. 
The departure of a country from 
the Eurozone would destabilise the 
entire currency union. Additional 
departures and thus related losses 
on euro-denominated financial 
assets would suddenly be possible. 
The currency union would hardly 
be more credible than a  system 
of fixed exchange rates. Capital market 
participants would find it enticing 
to flee from crisis countries and bet 
on further exits.
The euro crisis showed, however, 
that irreversibility also raises prob-
lems. It can be difficult for members 
of the currency union to escape an 
economic crisis. A Eurozone country 
cannot devalue its currency so as to 
sell its own products more cheaply  
on the global market. What’s more,  
it cannot pursue a monetary policy  
tailored to its needs in order to stimu- 
late investment. Instead, a Eurozone 
country in a crisis often has no other 
option than to drastically reduce wages 
and make its exports more attractive 
that way. The population suffers from 
this “internal devaluation”.
The dilemma: National sovereignty 
is difficult to combine with European 
stability. What is to be done if a Euro-
zone country does not recover and  
the population grows tired of cutting 
back and implementing reforms under  
 European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
programmes? On the one hand, a 
sovereign country would understand-
ably like to freely choose its economic 
policy. On the other, a country cannot 
obligate other Eurozone countries to 
cover the costs of these decisions. This 
is why – despite all the risks – it has 
been repeatedly discussed whether the 
currency union needs an exit option. 
“In case, debt sustainability and a credible implementation 
perspective cannot be ensured upfront, Greece should be 
offered swift negotiations on a time-out from the Eurozone, 
with possible debt restructuring, if necessary, […] over at 
least the next five years.” 
German Federal Ministry of Finance   
in a position paper on 11 July 2015
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